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Abstract
Given the imminent re-structuring of the Irish banking sector, an issue of substantial policy importance is that of
access to credit for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). As a compliment to ongoing eﬀorts to improve
our knowledge of this area using Irish ﬁrm-level data, we turn to Eastern Europe in an attempt to understand
the eﬀect of the crisis on ﬁrms’ credit access. Having matched countries from this sample to Ireland on the basis
of the evolution of key macro variables between 2005 and 2009, we show how ﬁrm-level credit access has been
signiﬁcantly hampered using ﬁrm-level data from the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development. The results present a worrying picture, with the percentage of ﬁrms suﬀering from adverse credit
conditions increasing signiﬁcantly in Latvia and Estonia, the two countries with the most similar macro pattern to
Ireland over the period of interest. We show using matching techniques that a ﬁrm in 2009 is 15% more likely to be
credit constrained than a near-identical ﬁrm in 2005. We provide suggestive evidence that this is a result of credit
rationing rather than an improvement in prudential lending practices in the banking sector.
1 Introduction
Small and Medium sized Enterprises’ (SMEs’) ac-
cess to credit will play an important role in Ireland’s
economic recovery. The degree to which ﬁrms can
access external ﬁnancing has been shown to have
an inﬂuence on the investment activity of the ﬁrm1
and the ability of the ﬁrm to trade internationally.2
These activities will both be of key importance to
the “export-led recovery” which is a key national
policy prerogative.
In the absence of regularly collected ﬁrm-level
data on this issue in Ireland, we attempt to of-
fer some understanding of the changing fate of
SMEs between the recent periods of boom and
recession by turning to the Business Environment
and Economic Performance Survey (BEEPS) ﬁrm-
level data from the World Bank and the Euro-
pean Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD). This data is collected in 2005 and 2009
for a stratiﬁed sample of ﬁrms in 28 Eastern Euro-
pean countries. The key advantage to this data is
that direct objective and subjective information is
available on ﬁrms’ access to credit, combined with
0The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reﬂect those of the Central Bank of
Ireland or the ESCB. I would like to thank Trevor Fitzpatrick, Martina Lawless, Maurice McGuire, Eoin McGuirk and Kieran
McQuinn for comments on an earlier draft. Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the author.
1Carbo-Valverde et al. (2008) show that credit constrained ﬁrms in the US must rely on trade credit rather than bank
lending to ﬁnance investment.
2Manova (2010) theoretically models poor ﬁnancing environments as aﬀecting ﬁrms’ entry into export markets and their
volume exported. Bas and Berthou (2011) show that in India ﬁnancing constraints lead to lower capital goods imports.
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typical ﬁrm-level measures relating to turnover,
employment, investment, international activity and
more.
Our methodology involves ﬁrst examining a
number of macro level variables of interest such as
GDP per capita, the ratio of private sector credit to
GDP and the ratio of bank loans to bank deposits,
to identify the Eastern European countries which
have undergone a similar “boom to bust” pattern
to Ireland over the 2005 to 2009 period. Once the
countries are identiﬁed, we then present a simple
descriptive exposition of the extent to which credit
access to ﬁrms has been hampered in these coun-
tries since the 2007/08 ﬁnancial crisis.
The countries found to be of most relevance
in this regard are Latvia and Estonia, which are
the only two countries to undergo large (double
digit) falls in output per capita in the 2007-2009
period. They are also the countries that had the
most inﬂated ﬁnancial sectors (apart from Ireland)
in the sample in 2007. This leads us to identify
them as countries with very similar boom-to-bust
characteristics, in that GDP per capita had been
growing rapidly, but had been coupled with rapid
(over)-development of the banking sector. We also
include Hungary and the Czech Republic as the
next most similar countries, although these coun-
tries did not undergo anything like the severe cor-
rection of Ireland, Estonia and Latvia. Figure 1
shows the trend in GDP per capita from 1995 to
2009 for Estonia, Latvia and Ireland, while Figure
2 shows the trend in growth of GDP per capita.
From both ﬁgures the similarity in the prolonged
boom period followed by a 2007/08 contraction is
clear to the reader. We must of course accept that
this analysis comes with important caveats: as Fig-
ure 1 shows, Ireland’s GDP per capita is far higher
than that of the countries studied here, while the
share of foreign capital in banking sectors of these
countries is far higher than Ireland’s. These and
other diﬀerences mean that despite similar macro-
level patterns, a direct extrapolation to the Irish
SME case should not be made using the results
presented in this paper.
We focus on SMEs as these are the ﬁrms that
are most likely to rely on external ﬁnance to fund
investments and survive through downturns in the
business cycle. We deﬁne an SME as a ﬁrm with
less than 250 employees. In the cases analysed
in this note, SMEs represent upwards of 80 and
sometimes 90 per cent of the ﬁrms sampled in
each country. The focus on SMEs also relates
to numerous policy prescriptions in Ireland which
recommend that the development of a thriving in-
digenous exporting sector is vital to the rebalanc-
ing and future stability of the Irish economy. Ac-
counting for 96% of ﬁrms are 58% of employment
in manufacturing3, SMEs represent a signiﬁcant
component in the Irish economy.
The results of this paper tell us that in the
countries most similar to Ireland, ﬁrms’ self-
reported measures of access to credit have all de-
teriorated, some quite dramatically. The propor-
tion of ﬁrms that have been rejected when apply-
ing for a loan, the proportion of ﬁrms identifying
access to ﬁnance as a major or severe obstacle to
doing business, and the proportion of credit con-
strained ﬁrms4 have all increased in Latvia and Es-
tonia between 2005 and 2009, the two years for
which we have the relevant data. Using match-
ing techniques, we show that a ﬁrm in 2009 is 15
percent more likely to be credit constrained than a
near-identical ﬁrm in 2005. Using a diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence estimator and examining constraint rates
across the productivity distribution, we also con-
clude that this increase is more likely the result
of credit rationing rather than an improvement in
bank lending standards.
3Figures from the CSO’s Census of Industrial Production
4Deﬁned as those who were rejected for a loan or those who did not apply for a loan for reasons other than good ﬁnancial
health.
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2 What we know in Ireland
The reason this research attempts to benchmark
Eastern European countries to give an indication
of what may be occuring in Ireland is that ﬁrm-level
data on the issue is limited in scope. At the ag-
gregate level, the Central Bank (2010) data show
that the total stock of SME lending in Ireland fell
by 5.1% between Q1 and Q3 of 2010, indicating
that repayments are being made more quickly than
new loans are being drawn down. The report also
points out that the decline in SME lending has
been proportionally greater than the underlying de-
cline in total business lending over the period, sug-
gesting that SMEs are being denied funding, albeit
without any micro evidence of how justiﬁable the
credit withholding has been.
From a number of diﬀerent data sources, we
can arrive at a picture of how credit conditions
have changed since the end of the Celtic Tiger era.
Brown et al. (2010), using the same data source
as this current note, show that in 2005 only 2%
of Irish ﬁrms5 were rejected for a loan, and only
2% were discouraged from applying for a loan due
to adverse credit conditions. This compares with
28% and 12% discouragement rates, and 8% and
5% rejection rates in Eastern and Western Europe
respectively. Thus it does seem that in the boom
period in Ireland, credit conditions were extremely
favourable, even compared to neighbouring coun-
tries.
Information contained in the Mazars series of
reports6 is informative of the current SME credit
situation in Ireland. These reports have estimated
that in Q4 2009 the approval rate on Irish SME
loan applications was 84%, falling from 87% in Q4
2008. The value of loan applications has also fallen
over the same period by 35%, with the number
of applications for loans and overdrafts also falling
from Q4 2008 to Q4 2009 by 18.3%. While this in-
formation is certainly indicative, we feel that when
attempting to map out the pattern of credit de-
mand, it is important to acknowledge that ﬁrms
not applying for credit are not necessarily all in
good ﬁnancial health. Firms may decide not to
make applications because the proposed rates are
too punitive, or they feel the probability of rejec-
tion is too high (as Mazars (2010) acknowledge,
their data cannot track informal inquiries that do
not result in an application for credit). If this is
the case, a decrease in the number of credit ap-
plications is not synonymous with a fall in credit
demand, nor is the rejection rate a correct barom-
eter for credit supply. Furthermore, the Mazars se-
ries of reports covers a relatively short time frame
(2008-09). The longer time horizon of the BEEPS
data set allows a comparison of credit conditions
between a boom-time and a recessionary year, thus
oﬀering a timely indication of the eﬀect of the re-
cession on credit access.
At the ﬁrm level, the CSO has recently re-
leased the results of its Access to Finance survey,
which surveyed 3,000 ﬁrms7 in the real economy
in 2010, asking about ﬁnancing conditions in 2010
and 2007. The survey reports a fall in the loan
approval rate among the ﬁrms surveyed from 90
to 50 percent, pointing to a marked deterioration
in access to credit among these ﬁrms since the on-
set of the crisis, despite the caveat that a signiﬁ-
cant share of ﬁrms “not approved” were in fact ap-
proved for an amount smaller than the total credit
desired. The survey also reports that 45 percent of
respondents believe the cost of obtaining ﬁnance
has gotten higher, 48 percent believe the burden of
obtaining ﬁnance has gotten worse, and 61 percent
believe that banks have become more unwilling to
provide ﬁnance. A clear picture of an increasing
share of ﬁrms being denied credit in Ireland since
2007 emerges from the CSO survey. This survey
has added hugely to our knowledge of a previously
under-studied topic in Ireland. Our understanding
of the issue will be improved further as microeco-
nomic analysis linking this information to ﬁrm-level
characteristics becomes available.
At the European Level, the ECB has carried
out the SAFE survey over the 4 six-month peri-
ods from start 2009 to end 2010. This survey has
published results for Germany, France, Italy, Spain
and “Rest of Europe”, which includes Ireland. The
sample size for Ireland hovers around 100 for the
ﬁrst three periods, increasing to 500 in the second
half of 2010. The representativeness of the sample
is only guaranteed at the overall “Rest of Europe”
level, meaning that conclusions are diﬃcult to draw
from the Irish data.
5A version of the survey was carried out in 2005 only for a number of Western European economies.
6See Mazars (2009a), Mazars (2009b), Mazars (2010).
7With a smaller eﬀective sample.
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3 Choosing subject countries
We match countries to Ireland along four variables
which are most relevant when thinking about the
collapse of economic activity in Ireland and its ef-
fect on the banking sector: GDP per capita, ab-
solute private sector credit in the economy, the
ratio of private sector credit to GDP and the ra-
tio of bank loans to bank deposits. We look at
countries’ growth in these variables from 2002 to
2007 (the last year in which Ireland had real GDP
growth), and then observe the percentage change
in our variables of interest from 2007 to 2009.
The countries that most closely match Ireland’s
pattern for these two time periods along these
four variables will be the most suitable countries
in which to analyse the change in credit condi-
tions for ﬁrms from 2005, a period of huge expan-
sion, and 2009, a year in deep recession. Table
1 shows the ratio of private sector credit to GDP
(PSC:GDP) and the ratio of bank credit to bank
deposits (BC:BD) in 2007, the “peak” year for
Irish GDP per capita. As the table shows, in this
year Irish banking had become hugely inﬂated, with
ratios that dwarf any ﬁgures in Eastern Europe
(PSC:GDP of 184% and Bank Credit to Deposit
ratio of 208%). The countries that come closest
to Ireland in terms of PSC:GDP are Estonia and
Latvia with 84 and 82 percent ratios respectively,
indicating that they were the most ﬁnancially de-
veloped countries in Eastern Europe. Along with
Bosnia and Herzegovina, both Estonia and Latvia
are also the two countries with the closest ratios
of BC:BD to Ireland, with 206 and 239 percent
respectively. This measure of the over-exposure of
the banking sector suggests that Latvia was even
more at risk than Ireland to an economic collapse
in 2007, while Estonia was at almost identical risk.
Moving on to the change in our variables of
interest from the 2007 peak to 2009, Table 2 gives
the ﬁgures for each country in our dataset, with
Ireland also included in bold. This table tells us
that, as one might expect given the exposures out-
lined in Table 1, Latvia and Estonia are the coun-
tries that follow most closely the Irish experience.
Latvia’s GDP per capita fell slightly more than
Ireland’s over the period, with Estonia’s falling
slightly less. These two countries both had sim-
ilarly sluggish increases in the overall stock of pri-
vate sector credit, with only Croatia experiencing
similarly small increases over the period. Our other
two measures unveil a set of other countries in
which the ﬁnancial sector expanded at a similarly
sluggish pace to Ireland. The Czech Republic and
Hungary stand out as the countries that have the
most similar ﬁgures to Ireland for both PSC:GDP
and BC:BD.
Having analysed both the situation in 2007 and
the subsequent changes from 2007 to 2009, we feel
that Latvia and Estonia are the countries of most
relevance to our study. Hungary and Czech Re-
public are included to expand the analysis, but re-
sults for these two countries will be attributed less
weighting due to their economic corrections not
coming close to the extreme changes experienced
in Ireland, Latvia and Estonia since 2007.
4 Description of the shift in
ﬁrms’ credit conditions be-
tween 2005 and 2009
Having identiﬁed comparator countries, we now
examine the change in SME credit conditions in
the pre and post-crisis period. The data we use is
the Business Environment and Economic Perfor-
mance Survey (BEEPS), carried out by the World
Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development in 2002, 2005 and 2009. We are
interested in the latter two years as information on
Estonian and Latvian ﬁrms’ credit access is only
available for these two years. A stratiﬁed sam-
pling methodology gives us a representative sam-
ple across manufacturing, construction, retail and
services sectors. For our credit access variable of
interest, we have between 400 and 500 observa-
tions across Latvia and Estonia in each of 2005
and 2009, increasing to over 1,000 if we include
the Czech Republic and Hungary.
Table 3 gives the change in the share of ﬁrms
surveyed that had a loan application rejected in the
previous year. The structure of the table reﬂects
countries’ similarity to Ireland, i.e. Latvia has had
the most similar economic pattern between 2005
and 2009, with Estonia the second most similar
etc. The table clearly shows that when we look
at rejection rates, there is an unambiguous pat-
tern: across each of our four countries of focus,
the percentage of ﬁrms having had a loan applica-
tion rejected has increased rather dramatically. In
Latvia, only 5 percent of ﬁrms experienced a rejec-
tion in 2005, with that ﬁgure rising to 18 percent
in 2009.
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In Table 4 the share of ﬁrms that report that
access to ﬁnance is “no or a minor obstacle”, “a
moderate obstacle” or a major or severe obstacle”
is outlined. On this more subjective measure of
credit access, we again see that in Latvia there
has been a dramatic increase in the share of ﬁrms
reporting themselves in a poor credit position. The
ﬁgures for Estonia and Hungary do not show any
marked increase in credit-related diﬃculties, while
a moderate increase was found for the Czech Re-
public. Subjective responses must of course always
be treated with caution as they are heavily inﬂu-
enced by ﬁrms’ perceptions of their position rela-
tive to their peer group.
The literature has oﬀered many varying ways
of deﬁning “credit constraints”. These often in-
volve looking at ratios of debt to equity or other
measures involving the debt burden of a ﬁrm. The
advantage of using the BEEPS is that we can iden-
tify ﬁrms that are truly constrained in the credit
market. Table 3 has already shown how the share
of ﬁrms having a loan rejection has evolved over
time. This however does not represent a true mea-
sure of credit constrained ﬁrms, as only ﬁrms who
have made an application for credit are expected to
have answered the question with either a “yes”‘or
a “no”. The BEEPS data allows us to improve
our deﬁnition of credit constrained ﬁrms by asking
ﬁrms the following question:
“What was the main reason why this establishment
did not apply for any line of credit or loan in ﬁs-
cal year?” The ﬁrm is given a choice of answers,
the ﬁrst of which is “No need for a loan - ﬁrm
has suﬃcient capital”. The range of other choices
may all be described as “adverse reasons” for not
applying for a loan, including complicated applica-
tion procedures, unfavourable interest rates, overly
strict collateral requirements, insuﬃcient size of
loan, the need for informal payments to expedite
the process, or the ﬁrm believing their application
would not be approved. Any ﬁrm reporting any
of the above reasons must be included along with
those who were rejected for a loan application in
deﬁning ﬁrms as “credit constrained”. We thus
create a variable which deﬁnes ﬁrms as not credit
constrained if they were not rejected for a loan in
the last year, or they did not apply for a loan due
to rude ﬁnancial health. We believe this variable
truly captures the ﬁrms’ ability to borrow. Table
5 replicates the exercise of Table 3 for the Credit
Constrained variable. Again we see an almost dou-
bling in the share of ﬁrms that are credit con-
strained when comparing 2005 with 2009 in Latvia
and Estonia. The share of ﬁrms has not changed
in Hungary or Czech Republic, our two countries
which have experienced a less severe collapse than
Ireland, Latvia or Estonia.
For each table analysing ﬁrms, we extend the
analysis by removing the SME restriction to look at
all ﬁrms, regardless of size. We ﬁnd that in every
case, upwards of 80% of ﬁrms are in fact SMEs,
and changing the sample to focus on all ﬁrms leads
to slightly lower estimates of the deterioration in
credit conditions, indicating that SMEs are faring
worse than larger ﬁrms, as one would expect.
5 Are credit-constrained ﬁrms
suﬀering from credit ra-
tioning?
One diﬃculty in the above analysis is determin-
ing the extent to which these ﬁrms are being
denied credit due to a disfunctional credit mar-
ket (credit rationing), as opposed to an improve-
ment in banks’ lending practices. Calomiris and
Longhofer (2008), in their deﬁnition of credit ra-
tioning, state that “changes in the interest rate
cannot be used to clear excess demand for loans in
the market” and treat credit rationing as “a supply
side phenomenon, with the lender’s supply function
becoming perfectly price inelastic at some point.”
This deﬁnition gives the essence of the problem
facing most developed countries presently - can we,
in observing a lack of credit drawn down, conclude
that credit rationing is indeed the culprit?
Answering this question presents methodologi-
cal challenges. Without claiming to conclusively
distinguish between the two above explanations
for the lack of credit granted to ﬁrms, we adopt
two approaches to point towards one or the other.
Beforehand, we use a propensity score matching
(PSM) methodology which tells us whether a ﬁrm
in 2009 is more likely than an almost identical ﬁrm
in 2005 to be credit constrained.
The characteristics of ﬁrms in need of credit
will inevitably inﬂuence the probability of being
credit constrained. We account for this potential
bias by using PSM to ascertain whether a ﬁrm that
would have accessed credit in 2005 was unable to
do so in 2009. We limit the sample to Estonian
and Latvian SMEs in 2005 and 2009. We assign a
2009 dummy as the “treatment” variable, so that
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ﬁrms in 2009 are our treatment group and ﬁrms
in 2005 are our control group. We then match a
treatment ﬁrm in 2009 with a control ﬁrm in 2005
along a range of relevant observables which are
outlined below.
Our PSM methodology begins by running a
probit regression where the dependent variable,
treat is a dummy variable taking a 1 if the ﬁrm is
reporting in 2009 and a 0 if the ﬁrm is reporting
in 2005. The equation is:
Pr(Treati) = fn(FirmV arsi,δcountry,δsector)
(1)
Where the vector FirmV ars includes sales, em-
ployment, skilled employment share, output per
worker, exporter dummy, importer dummy, foreign
ownership dummy, percentage of ﬁxed assets pur-
chases funded by internal funds and percentage of
ﬁxed assets purchases funded by owners’ contribu-
tions or new issued equity. The ﬁrst seven variables
give a measure of the production-side performance
of the ﬁrm which should adequately capture how
viable an operation the ﬁrm has. The ﬁnal two
measures give an indication of the ﬁnancial health
of the ﬁrm, showing to what extent the ﬁrm can
self-ﬁnance investment. δcountry ensures that we
match an Estonian ﬁrm with an Estonian ﬁrm, and
a Latvian with a Latvian, while δsector ensures that
the estimator takes account of the 18 NACE2 sec-
tors into which we can classify ﬁrms in the data.
The PSM estimator predicts a propensity score
( ˆ Pr(treat)) for every observation, and matches a
ﬁrm in the treatment group to a ﬁrm in the con-
trol group with the closest propensity score. The
validity of the estimator relies on the assumption
that the only unobservable diﬀerence between the
matched ﬁrms is their treatment status. In our
case this gives the interpretation that, if we have
matched with suﬃcient quality, the only factor ex-
plaining whether or not a ﬁrm is credit constrained
is whether it is reporting in 2009 or 2005.
Table 6 gives the results of this exercise. For
ease of exposition we report only the r2 from the
ﬁrst stage probit regression which estimates the
propensity score, along with the means for the
treatment and control group before and after the
matching has been carried out. The table tells
us that before matching, the dummy variable for
credit constraints had a mean of .18 among 2009
ﬁrms and .08 among control ﬁrms, with the dif-
ference being statistically signiﬁcant. Once the
matching has been carried out, we see that the
matched control ﬁrms now have a mean of only
.03, with the diﬀerence of .15 in the mean between
the two groups being statistically signiﬁcant at the
1 percent level.8 The interpretation of the results
is that the average diﬀerence in the likelihood of
being credit constrained between a ﬁrm in 2009
and its “twin” in 2005 is 15 percent.
With the knowledge that ﬁrms in 2009 are
more likely than almost identical ﬁrms in 2005 to
be credit constrained, we attempt to understand
whether this trend is due to “credit rationing” by
banks, or whether this in fact represents better
banking practices. The evidence as presented so
far could be interpreted to oﬀer support for either
of the above hypotheses, as it simply states that
ﬁrms are more likely to be rejected in 2009 than
identical ﬁrms in 2005.
One way to get at the relative merits of the
above two arguments is to examine the perfor-
mance proﬁle of ﬁrms that were credit constrained
and unconstrained in the two periods. Our working
hypothesis is that in a prudent credit market, we
should see a larger performance gap between un-
constrained and constrained ﬁrms than we would
in an exuberant credit market. The intuitive rea-
son for this is that in an exuberant market, ﬁrms
in the middle of the performance distribution are
more likely to get a loan, thus meaning that on
average, unconstrained ﬁrms appear less produc-
tive. In a prudent market, this same intermediate
range of ﬁrms are less likely to get a loan, increas-
ing the mean performance of unconstrained ﬁrms,
thus widening the performance gap. In Table 7 we
look at four proxies for ﬁrm performance: sales,
employment, labour productivity and the skilled
worker share of employment. If the hypothesis that
banks have become more prudent holds, then we
should see that the unconstrained ﬁrms will ap-
pear to perform relatively better than constrained
ﬁrms in 2009 than in 2005. We run a Diﬀerence
in Diﬀerence model as follows:
Yi = Treat + CC + Treat∗CC (2)
where Treat takes a 1 in 2009 and a 0 in 2005,
8Propensity Score tests were carried out on the control variables. For all variables apart from the foreign ownership dummy,
we reject the hypothesis that, after matching, there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the mean between control and treatment
groups. We also run the regressions using three-nearest-neighbours and Kernel matching, with minimal change in the estimate
for the Average Treatment Eﬀect.
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and CC is the credit constrained dummy. For our
hypothesis to hold, we should see a negative sig-
niﬁcant sign on Treat∗CC, indicating that credit
constrained ﬁrms in 2009 are performing worse on
average, controlling both for the overall diﬀerence
in performance between 2009 and 2005, and the
diﬀerence between constrained and unconstrained
ﬁrms in general. Table 7 reports results for four
versions of equation 2, with Y being sales, em-
ployment, labour productivity or skilled share per
worker. Credit Constrained enters with a negative
sign at all times (though signiﬁcant in only one
case), indicating that these ﬁrms are as expected
weaker performing. Importantly for our purposes,
we never see a negative signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on
Treat∗CC; rather the coeﬃcient is positive and
insignﬁcant in each case. This tells us that there
is no evidence of an improvement in lending prac-
tices leading to a healthier loan book: Credit con-
strained ﬁrms in 2009 do not appear to be signiﬁ-
cantly worse in their performance.
Our ﬁnal attempt to identify the mechanisms
driving the increased frequency of credit con-
strained ﬁrms is to look at the share of credit
constrained ﬁrms across the productivity distribu-
tion. We take, for Latvia and Estonia only, the
quintiles of the labour productivity distribution in
2005 and 2009, and examine the share of ﬁrms
that are reporting being credit constrained. Ta-
ble 8 shows that, apart from the anomalous sec-
ond quintile, the rate of credit constrained ﬁrms
is close to monotonically decreasing in labour pro-
ductivity in both years, as one would expect. In
terms of the share of constrained ﬁrms in 2009 rel-
ative to 2005, the largest increase is in the second
quintile, which suggests that banks have become
stricter on these lower productivity ﬁrms, pointing
to more prudent banking practices. However, the
fact that the second largest increase is in the ﬁfth
quintile, and that the appearance of credit con-
strained ﬁrms has increased in every quintile from
2005 to 2009, suggests that it is more likely the
case that banks have simply begun to ration credit
to all types of ﬁrms.
The results of Tables 7 and 8 shed some light
on the mechanisms behind the results of Table 6.
Given what we have observed, we believe the fact
that an identical ﬁrm is ﬁve times more likely to be
credit constrained after the crisis than before the
crisis is suggestive of credit rationing rather than
better banking. This has important policy impli-
cations in that it suggests that viable ﬁrms may
be hampered in investing and trading internation-
ally due to this withholding which would otherwise
have been available to them.
6 Conclusion
The message to take from this research is a clear
and unsurprising one - since the global ﬁnancial
crisis has hit in 2007, SMEs in countries with a
very similar experience to Ireland have been sub-
ject to signiﬁcant deterioration in their credit ac-
cess. A higher share of SMEs are being rejected for
loans, not applying for loans becuase they judge it
is not worthwhile to apply, and reporting that ac-
cess to ﬁnance is a “major” or “severe” obstacle
to their operations. What is perhaps surprising
is the extent to which access to credit has been
hampered. In Latvia, a quarter of SMEs surveyed
by the World Bank are now credit constrained by
our deﬁnition. The near-doubling in negative re-
sponses to the survey questions of interest between
2005 and 2009 indicates that the post-2007 con-
traction has had signiﬁcant worrying consequences
for SMEs, to whom countries such as Ireland are in
part looking for an export-led recovery. Propensity
score matching methodology allows us to compare
ﬁrms in 2009 to their most similar ﬁrm (as a func-
tion of a wide range of relevant observables) in
2005. We ﬁnd evidence that ﬁrms in 2009 are 15
percent more likely to be credit constrained than
the most similar ﬁrm in 2005. We provide sugges-
tive evidence that this is due to a blanket with-
olding of credit as opposed to an improvement in
lending standards of the banking sector. Previ-
ous literature leads us to expect that such a se-
vere credit market shock to such a large portion
of SMEs is likely to have signiﬁcant knock-on ad-
verse impacts on indigenous investment, exports
and growth.
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Table 1: Country-Level Measures in 2007. (PSC = Private Sector Credit)
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Table 2: Percentage Change in each variable, 2007-2009. PSC = (Private Sector Credit)
iso3 GDPPC PSC PSC: Bank Credit:
GDP Deposits
ALB 14 143 113 60
ARM -6 65 75 108
AZE 26 51
BGR 9 69 57 46
BIH 20 -2
BLR 15 20
CZE 2 34 31 25
EST -14 21 41 35
GEO 11 119 99 37
HRV 2 19 17 -6
HUN -2 25 27 21
IRL -12 14 26 21
KAZ 4 92 82 55
KGZ 12 94 68 106
LTU -7 37 48 30
LVA -18 8 32 32
MDA 7 70 59 25
MKD 7 69 58 12
MNE -1 93
POL 12 53 37 36
ROM 5 82 74 47
RUS -1 50 53 11
SRB 7 33 25 -9
SVK 5 28 23 25
SVN -1 34 36 59
TJK 12
TUR -2 38 38 19
UKR -8 34
UZB 19
Table 3: In the last year, were you rejected for a loan application?
Country Year No (%) Yes(%) N
Latvia 2005 95 5 184
2009 79 21 87
Estonia 2005 97 3 198
2009 88 12 107
Hungary 2005 99 1 558
2009 93 7 75
Czech Rep. 2005 96 4 314
2009 86 14 88
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Table 4: How much of an obstacle is access to ﬁnance? 0=No or minor obstacle; 1=Moderate
obstacle; 2=Major or severe obstacle
Country Year 0 1 2 N
Latvia 2005 76 20 4 173
2009 50 25 25 228
Estonia 2005 77 17 6 185
2009 80 14 7 235
Hungary 2005 47 27 26 534
2009 78 11 11 235
Czech Rep. 2005 44 37 19 308
2009 42 33 25 217
Table 5: 1=Credit Constrained; 0=Not. A ﬁrm is not credit constrained if it was not rejected for
a loan, or if it did not apply for a loan due to good ﬁnancial health.
Country Year 0 (%) 1(%) N
Latvia 2005 86 14 184
2009 75 25 216
Estonia 2005 94 6 198
2009 89 11 232
Hungary 2005 92 8 558
2009 90 10 242
Czech Rep. 2005 83 17 314
2009 84 16 210
Table 6: Propensity Score Matching results
Treatment: 2009 ﬁrms; Control: 2005 ﬁrms
Outcome variable: Credit Constraint Dummy
Treated Control Diﬀerence SE t
Unmatched .18 .0807 .0993∗∗∗ .0375 2.64
ATT .18 .0300 .1500∗∗∗ .0484 3.10
N 100 223
R2 from 1st stage probit: 0.2038
Method: Nearest Neighbour matching with one neighbour
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Table 7: Diﬀerence in Diﬀerence results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Var. Sales Employment Lab. Prod. Skilled/Employment
Treat (2009 Dummy) 1.151*** 10.99 0.438*** 0.100**
(8.02) (0.36) (5.78) (3.17)
Credit Constrained -1.305*** -110.5 -0.206 -0.0258
(-3.68) (-1.50) (-1.10) (-0.49)
Treat∗CC 0.565 29.18 0.105 0.0401
(1.32) (0.32) (0.46) (0.49)
Constant 13.59*** 125.3*** 10.57*** 0.436***
(128.82) (5.69) (189.81) (27.65)
N 850 927 850 576
r2 0.101 0.00512 0.0454 0.0232
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 8: Credit Constrained ﬁrms’ share of all ﬁrms in LVA and EST by Quintile of Labour Pro-
ductivity, 2005 and 2009
Quintile % Credit Constrained
2005 2009
1 15 21
2 4 19
3 14 20
4 8 12
5 4 11
13